by Maj. Gen. C. K. Karumbaya, SM (Retd).
Prelude: In 1965, Pak under Field Marshal Ayub Khan having acquired modern aircrafts, tanks and other armament from USA, as a member of SEATO, planned to wrest J&K from India militarily. They imagined that the Indian Armed Forces were a demoralised lot after the drubbing we got from China in 1962 and political leadership had gone weak after Nehru’s death. Pakistan thought that it was a historic opportunity for them to use force against India to attain their objective.
Pak started off with a diversionary attack in Rann of Kutch and followed it up with ‘Op Gibralter’ to infiltrate a large force, led by officers into Kashmir Valley to disrupt communication, cause panic and take over the administration. Both these were not only defeated by Indian Armed Forces but they captured strategic Haji Pir Pass which was used by them for infiltration. Undaunted, they on 1st Sept. 1965, launched ‘Op Grand Slam’ with two major offensives along Chamb – Jurian and in Punjab along R. Beas to cut off J&K from the rest of India.
Mobilisation and Concentration
India lost no time in declaring Emergency and countering with ‘Op Riddle.’ My Battalion (Bn), 5 MARATHA LI had arrived in Baroda (Vadadora) a few days earlier after a long tenure in North East and was in the process of settling down, when at night on 1st Sept., we got orders to mobilise and move to Ahmedabad for further orders. As we were short of transport, we requisitioned some civil vehicles and moved out before the people of Baroda woke up.
At Ahmedabad, the GOC of 11 Inf Div. Maj. Gen. Naveen Rawlly, MC told us that our 30 Inf Bde was to carry out an offensive into Sind as a diversionary attack, in order to attract Pak reserve Division in W. Punjab and that we should move post-haste to our Concentration Area between Barmer and Gadra Road (Rajasthan). Thanks to the patriotism of the way side civil petrol stations, who supplied fuel to us merely by accepting written receipts, we were able to move non-stop and reach our destination the very next day — a distance of about 400 km; but we had to wait two more days for other units of the Bde to fetch up and prepare for the battles ahead. With just 7 years service, I was the senior most Coy Commander (C Coy) in my Bn and was the only officer in the Bde, trained in commando operations. Much was expected of me and I was confident of living up to the expectations.
Offensive commences
On 6th Sept., Brig Buppy Guha gave his orders for the capture of Gadra City, a medium sized town 5 kms inside Sind by the Bde. As per the intelligence provided by Muslim smugglers operating in the area, only Pak Rangers were operating against us and there were no regular Army in the area. The attack was to be launched next morning and my Coy was to infiltrate behind the enemy as a preliminary operation and establish a block behind Gadra City, before the attack.
My Coy was the first to cross the Sind border soon after sun set. We moved in single file with myself in front with compass in hand for navigation. We moved fast for about 14 kms to find a suitable place and by 4 am, I selected a place on track Gadra City — Kokrapara which was their nearest Railway Station close to the border. At dawn, I heard firing in Gadra City signifying that our Bde attack had started as planned. The escaping enemy could use any route in the open desert; but luckily 7 Pak soldiers walked into our ambush, unaware of our presence. We could have killed them; but they capitulated without any resistance. They were regular soldiers from Baluch Regiment and they had been in that area training in desert warfare for quite some time. This was contrary to the earlier information given by the smugglers, who were obviously pro-Pak. These were the first batch of PsOW captured by our Bde, who gave us valuable information. We treated them humanely as per Geneva Convention.
Advance towards Kokrapara and Air Attack
After the capture of Gadra City by the Bde, my Bn linked up with me and we were ordered to advance towards Kokrapara. As the track was unfit for heavy vehicles, we took only few 1 tonners to carry essential ammunition and water. As we were advancing, our column was attacked by two Pak Sabre 86 aircrafts due to which one our ammunition vehicle was blown up. From then on till the end of the war these aircrafts kept attacking us with impunity as our own IAF could not spare a single aircraft to our Sector!
By last light we reached a village called Sakarbu, with a biggish sand dune feature next to it where we firmed in. Next day, except my Coy, the rest of the Bn was withdrawn to Gadra City for its defence. Seeing us, the poor villagers of Sakarbu wanted to flee but I advised them that we were not a threat to their safety and they could lock up their houses, take their valuables and in an organised manner go towards Pak leaving behind few guards. I assured them that we had come there to meet the aggression of the Pak Army on our sacred land and we have no enmity but only goodwill towards them. I can never forget their expression of gratitude and their blessings “Kuda ap sab ko bala kare” (May God bless you all).
Aborted raid on Dali
A day later, my Coy too was pulled back to Gadra City to carry out a raid on Dali, which was a known enemy position in the interior. I was allotted trained camels from Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC later converted into BSF) to carry 3 inch mortars and MMGs with ammunition and water. We moved cross-country away from the track to avoid air attacks. Enemy aircrafts did overfly, but could not notice us as our camels just sat down and froze like well-trained soldiers! This was my first experience with camels — they could move on the desert in the scorching heat without water for days. When we were in the striking distance of Dali and planning the raid at night, I had an urgent message to call off the raid and rush back to Gadra City to deal with a serious situation !
Clearing of Pak Road Block at Khadin
When I returned to Gadra City, I was told that an enemy motorised column was successful in entering Indian territory and capturing a RAC Post at Khadin which was half-way between Gadra Road, our nearest Indian Railway Station and Munabao, where the old defunct Railway line entered Pak territory. They had effectively cut off 3 GUARDS and B Coy from my Bn which were operating in Munabao. A squadron-less two troops of tanks from Skinners Horse (Sherman Tanks) under Maj. Chopra was to join us, to clear the enemy block at Khadin. We moved piggy back on the tanks. It was agreed between us that when we contact the enemy, we would jump off from the tanks, move on a flank to assault, while the tanks would take hull down position to give us covering fire. Unfortunately, four of the tanks got bogged down in the sand and we had to march on foot.
Only late in the evening, we contacted the enemy, who fired their mortars, 106 RCL (Anti tank) and MMGs at us from a high ground astride the track behind the Khadin village. A few thatched huts in the village were burning due to Pak fire and in the dark their tracer bullets were flying all over our heads. It was a spectacular sight to behold as though we were witnessing a Diwali extravaganza, even though the situation was grim with one of my jawan lying wounded due to the shelling. Due to darkness, the three tanks which managed to reach the area were useless, as they did not have night fighting capability. However, their mere presence could have scared the enemy.
We carried out aggressive patrolling on the flanks at night due to which the enemy got panicky and fled in the cover of darkness with their vehicles. Their vehicles had balloon tyres to move on the desert unlike ours. My company occupied the post without opposition by midnight. In the morning, Maj. Chopra without my knowledge, informed the Brigade from his wireless set that we had succeeded in clearing the road block and he was getting back to retrieve his tanks.
As for me, we had not yet accomplished the mission fully as the enemy had withdrawn only up to Sakarbu height, which was previously held by us and directing artillery fire on us. We had to evict them from there to ensure that route to Munabao was safe. So, I requested my Bn to send me mortars and MMGs for attack on them next night and myself took a small patrol towards Sakarbu using sand dunes as cover, to plan attack. Strangely, I saw and heard them scooting from there too during mid-day. After ensuring the position was abandoned by them, I used my initiative, in the absence of communication failure with the Bde, to handover Khadin Post to RAC personnel who were in hiding not far away during Pak occupation and had rejoined us after it was recaptured by us.
Thereafter, I moved my Company to occupy Sakarbu, which was tactically more important for us. The route to Munabao was thus opened and it was now safer. Next day, the Bde sent a coy of 1 Garh Rif to relieve my Coy at Sakarbu and was called back to Gadra City. I thought it was to give us time to rest and recoup but alas it was not to be!
My last Mission: When I reached Gadra City, our new Bde Cdr, Brig. Summanwar complimented me for my Coy’s action at Khadin and Sakarbu but said that he had sent composite force with 17 MADRAS, a part of my Bn under my CO and a Coy of 1 Garh Rifs, inland towards Dali to capture more areas. They had captured Jasse ke Par, Dali and Pirani ki Par; but as there was a complete breakdown of communication with them, he was anxious to know about the situation on that front. He, therefore, wanted me to take a strong patrol mounted on 1 ton vehicles with mors and MMGs to bring back correct information, so that he could plan further operation.
I had Capt. Sardesai from my Bn to assist me as my second in command. It took the whole night to get the ASC vehicles and patrol ready. We could set out only in the morning with me in the lead vehicle and Capt. Desai in the last. We had to move dispersed due to the threat of air attack. As I was nearing Dali, I could hear a lot of firing there which made me move faster than the speed of my convoy behind. From a higher ground, I descended on a flatter area which was being overlooked by a high sand dune short of Dali.
On the skyline I noticed some figures. I saw through my binoculars to find that they were wearing Khaki uniform — they were unmistakably Pakistanis! The best I could do was to halt my convoy at higher ground left behind and take up a defence. So, I instructed the driver to reverse the vehicle and I got down to have a better look at the enemy. Just then, they fired artillery at us and unfortunately one shell fragment hit my right leg and it started bleeding. Nk Shinde, who was with me while helping me back into the vehicle, saw an enemy jeep mounted with 106 RCL less than 70 yds away and he fired at it with his rifle. The enemy crew, obviously scared, reversed into a depression, fortunately never to raise their heads again.
As I got back into my vehicle, we saw another enemy MMG mounted jeep trying to encircle us from a flank; but we managed to escape by driving fast back to the higher ground, where Capt. Sardesai was waiting for me. Fortunately, my wound was not life-threatening. While my wound was being bandaged to stop the bleeding, I could discuss the situation with Capt. Sardesai. We decided to deploy the patrol into a defensive position. I planned to get back to Gadra City to personally brief the Bde Cdr and attend to my wound.
After thanking Nk Shinde (without whose help, unmindful of his own safety, I would not have been alive today!) and dictating a situation report to be sent to the Bde, I left for Gadra City and reached there at night. Brig. Summanwar personally met me in the vehicle. After explaining what had happened, I recommended that a stronger reinforcement should be sent to help our beleaguered force at Dali and beyond. He discussed this with the Div. Cdr. and instructed 2IC of my Bn, Col. Sable to take the balance of my Bn with additional troops to stabilise the situation. It was nice of the Bde Cdr to take personal interest to arrange a hot dinner for me and evacuate me in an ambulance.
Cease Fire and After
While being evacuated, I was informed that night on 23rd Sept., India had declared unilateral cease fire. After two weeks of hospitalisation at Ahmedabad MH to tend to my wound, I was given a month’s sick leave to go home to Madikeri, where my parents were anxiously waiting for me. However, with the permission of my father, who had served in Burma as an Army Doctor during World War II, I voluntarily got back to my Bn at Gadra City, 15 days before my leave was to expire.
Taking advantage of the unilateral declaration of cease fire, Pak wilfully had tried to grab some unoccupied area of ours in Rajasthan, which led to skirmishes and casualties on both sides. By the time I returned, the situation had stabilised. Our Bde had achieved its objective, against heavy odds by capturing large area in Sind, which came in handy during the negotiation which followed after Tashkent Agreement. My CO, Col. Rattan Singh was designated to attend a flag meeting with Pak to finalise the plan for vacating the captured areas by us. He took me with him and he was pleasantly surprised to find that his counterpart, the Pak Col. was an old course-mate of his at the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun! After recognising, they hugged each other and the meeting ended amicably!
By a coincidence, my Coy which was to enter first into Pak territory was also the last to vacate it. In this senseless war, where there were no winners or losers, the loss of Lt. Ronald Serrao, our Intelligence Officer, who was killed at Dali after the Cease Fire and our gallant JCOs and men, was too overwhelming.
After the war, my Bn moved to Jodhpur where our Bde became a part of newly raised 12 Inf Div, which was to specialise in Desert Warfare. Under the new GOC, Maj. Gen. Satinder Singh, we trained hard and developed concepts peculiar to desert warfare, which paid us handsome dividends during the 1971 War with Pak.
Conclusion
In this war, we learnt how not to wage a war! My Bde was launched into battle poorly equipped and trained in desert warfare without any air support. Battalions are meant to fight as a homogeneous whole; but we were frequently split into coys and pls columns and mixed up with other bns deep into the desert without administrative backing. This was a major flaw in the conduct of war at Bde level. Yet, we achieved more than what was expected of us.
In sum, the 1965 War, which Pak imposed on us ended in a stalemate but taught secular India never to trust our religiously indoctrinated neighbour. In 1971, we did better mainly because of the powerful personality of our then Army Chief, Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw, who had a direct access to the Prime Minister bypassing bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defence but emerging India can no longer depend upon such personalities. We should take institutional measures backed by appropriate allotment of finances to safeguard our internal and external security.
It is high time that the unbroken legacies set by our first Prime Minister, to appoint Defence Ministers who lack basic knowledge of Military, have a Ministry of Defence wholly staffed by bureaucrats who enjoy all authority without responsibility and not integrating the three Services, namely, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force under one Chief of Defence Staff to fight future wars should be ended. I do sincerely hope that our politicians and influential sections of our people, who as a rule never send their sons into the Armed Forces, realise their responsibility towards the Nation and take positive steps.
Jai Hind.
source: http://www.starofmysore.com / Star of Mysore / Home> Feature Articles / Saturday – October 10th, 2015
